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Abstract: 
International legal scholarship pays much attention to normative interpretations of China’s 
stance toward international criminal justice, which contributes little to the potential synergy 
between the two. This article develops the current analytical framework in two ways: first by 
outlining the rationale behind China’s conventional critique of the ICC, namely concerning 
supranational jurisdiction, judicial complementarity and situations in Africa, that results in the 
discrepancy; secondly, it examines the shift in China’s diplomatic strategy and domestic 
judicial reforms, and the expanding presence in Africa that bring about an alternative approach. 
This article then concludes with four factors that are likely to lead to an optimal relationship 
between China and the ICC. 
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China’s position vis-à-vis the International Criminal Court (ICC) has emerged as a decisive 
topic of concern for the international system with China becoming an influential power 
particularly since its remarkable economic growth beginning in the 1990s. The Chinese 
government does not shy away from making its voice and preferences heard by its counterparts. 
China expressed its acknowledgment of the ICC’s role in international criminal justice, and its 
delegation addressed the session of the Assembly of States Parties to the Rome Statute in 
November 2015, saying that ‘the ICC has drawn more and more attention in the field of 
international affairs, … the work of ICC turns to proceed in a more efficient, cautious and 
pragmatic manner.’1  
On the other hand, China has not yet signed the Rome Statute, and has shown its reservations – 
and sometimes objections – toward the ICC’s operation. When the Third Committee of the 
United Nations’ General Assembly at its sixty-ninth session on 18 November 2014 approved a 
draft resolution on human rights situations in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Syria 
and Iran,2 China was placed in the international spotlight after it ‘responded negatively to stop 
any ICC referral.’3 China’s delegation voted against the draft resolution, saying that China 
would continue to oppose ‘the use of pressure on countries under the guise of protecting human 
rights’ and that the draft was ‘not practical, jeopardizing trust and provoking confrontation 
among Member States [of the United Nations].’4  
International legal scholars outside China are unfamiliar with the rationale behind China’s 
reaction to the ICC owing to the cultural barrier and more importantly, a tendency to 
underestimate an ongoing shift within China. China’s diplomatic positions have switched from 
stringently sticking to the primacy of state sovereignty to strategically enhancing China’s 
international impact. China’s stance toward the ICC can be easily grasped from records of 
international diplomatic bodies including the Preparatory Commission for the International 
Criminal Court or the General Assembly of United Nations or the Assembly of States Parties to 
the Rome Statute, occasionally accompanied by tactful but vague press releases from the 
                                                 
1  Statement by China Observer Delegation at the 14th Session of the Assembly of State Parties to the Rome Statute 
of the International Criminal Court, The Hague, 18-26 November 2015, accessed 9 January 2016 via: 
https://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/ASP14/GenDeb/ASP14-GenDeb--OS-China-ENG.pdf 
2  UN Meetings Coverage of General Assembly, 2014, “Intensely Debating Targeted Country Reviews, Third 
Committee Approves Draft Texts on Iran, Syria, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea”, Sixty-ninth session, 
46th & 47th Meetings, accessed 7 January 2015 via: www.un.org/press/en/2014/gashc4122.doc.htm  
3 Mirjam DONATH (2014), “U.N. panel calls for North Korea referral to international court”, Reuters, Tuesday 18 
November 2014 5:25pm EST, accessed 12 December 2015 via: www.reuters.com/article/2014/11/18/us-
northkorea-un-rights-idUSKCN0J22EG20141118 . 
4  UN Meetings Coverage of General Assembly, supra note 2, 2014.  
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Foreign Ministry of China. The rationale behind these statements is, however, neither apparent 
nor arbitrary.  
On the domestic level, even the Chinese policy makers have not arrived at some consensus 
about China’s relationship with the ICC as the latter is deemed complex. The Chinese officials 
would rather stay cautious and prudent, following a so-called ‘24-charater strategy’ composed 
by China’s former paramount leader Deng Xiaoping in 1990, that ‘observe calmly, secure our 
position, cope with affairs prudently, concentrate on enhancing our capacities, keep a low 
profile, and never claim leadership.’
5
 Now that the ICC as a sui generis permanent institution is 
quite new to the whole international system, its interaction with the international power 
structure as well as its impact on international justice need to be carefully explained so that 
Chinese government – as a ‘calm observer’ – is willing to actively get involved with the ICC.  
Aiming to reveal implicit factors that lead to China’s stance on the ICC, this article adds a 
contextual dimension to the current normative framework and demonstrates how historical 
exposure to the outer world affects the present-day minds of Chinese policymakers as well as 
the common public. The article is divided into three parts: first, an outline of issues that are 
often questioned by China; second, an analysis delving into the contextual aspect of China’s 
policy-making in the twentieth century; and lastly, an analysis of the potential factors 
attributing to synergy between China and the ICC. 
2. ICC ISSUES IN QUESTION 
With the ICC established as a permanent body in 2002, international criminal justice saw a 
momentous development for fighting against impunity; in the meanwhile, it invited some 
concerns in terms of the interpretation and application of the core basis on which the ICC 
operates. This part is not intended to provide a holistic introduction to China’s critique of the 
ICC, but instead seeks to highlight the issues that are frequently questioned by China.  
2.1 Judicial Supremacy Over Sovereignty? 
Speaking of the ICC’s role in contemporary criminal justice, one cannot obtain a sensible 
impression without looking into the key features of this first-ever treaty-based permanent 
international criminal court. Among other legacies from the previous international criminal 
tribunals, the ICC inherits the norm that impunity is under no condition acceptable and persons 
committing the most serious crimes must not go unpunished. The ICC’s value-oriented 
objective and its judicial nature as a supranational organ engender a concern for the 
enforcement of international justice and respect for state sovereignty.  
                                                 
5 Literature Research office of Central Committee of Communist Party of China, ed.: Chronicle of Deng Xiaoping 
(1975-1997), Central Literature Publisher, 2004 July, 1st edition,  p. 1346.  
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The critique relates to a broad tension between supranational jurisdiction and state sovereignty 
that deserves much attention, as many entities transcending state authorities are quite influential 
in present-day global dynamics. Divided views among states and jurists lie in a divergent 
understanding of the sources upon which the supranational jurisdiction is built and the extent to 
which it can apply, and also in a contrasting context in which developed and developing states 
experience the compromise differently. Literature about international criminal law clearly 
shows that customary international law, international treaties, and domestic legislation serve as 
the most important sources for the Rome Statute on the basis of which the ICC was founded.6 
While it is less explicit whether the international criminal norms developed in the past two 
decades are universally agreed on, and the extent to which the contextual differences of states 
affect their perception and application of those international norms. An interpretation of the 
judicial supremacy over state sovereignty that makes perfect sense to some societies is one that 
others may be hypercritical of.   
Looking back to history, after the principle was adopted in the 1648 Westphalia Peace Treaty 
that acknowledged each state’s exclusive territory authority, the application of this norm 
outside Europe was processed differently. The 1858 Treaty of Tientsin, for example, compelled 
the Chinese government to give up their sovereign rights and accept extraterritorial zones in 
which criminal suspects of British, French and Russian nationalities could only be trailed in 
consular courts free from Chinese jurisdiction. As a study on the history of international 
relations reveals, the Third-World countries were ones who ‘did not have states that were 
strong enough to withstand European or Western aggression; the African, Asian and Oceanic 
people, as they see it, were subject to domination, exploration, and humiliation. It is by getting 
control of states that they have been able to take charge of their own destiny.’7 Therefore, 
developed and developing states may not regard the significance of state sovereignty in the 
same way. 
The international community had to re-visit the ends of state sovereignty after the Second 
World War, and later assented to the concept that states should ‘set up [a supra-national regime] 
to overcome perceived problems arising from inadequately regulated or insufficiently 
coordinated national action.’8 And as supra-national tribunals at both regional and international 
levels emerged, the principles of criminal responsibility and other aspects of the ‘general part’ 
of criminal law have been posited in a heated debate: as to the most serious crimes against the 
fundamental values of humanity, should judicial supremacy over state sovereignty be accepted 
                                                 
6 MA Chengyuan (2012), “The Connotation of Universal Jurisdiction and its Application in the Criminal Law of 
China,” FICHL Publication Series, No. 15,  page 155. 
7  Hedley BULL(1979), “The State’s Positive Role in World Affairs,” Daedalus, Vol. 108, No. 4, The State, Fall, 
page 121, stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20024638. 
8  Jack DONNELLY(2013), Universal Human Rights in Theory and Practice, New York: Cornell University Press,  
page 614. 
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in order to provide the last resort for criminal justice? The ICC’s expectation is gradually 
incorporated into a normative framework maintaining that states should cooperate on cross-
territory trials, and that they should facilitate the ICC’s exercise of its jurisdiction. However, 
the ICC’s initiation of an investigation is not necessarily dependent on the state’s consent can 
be problematic in light of how contrary the applications of customary international law were in 
history. Hence the ICC’s operational mechanism, which allows itself to exercise mandate in a 
sovereign state, is arguably a potential intervention in sovereignty and political independence of 
states. 
The ICC may exercise its jurisdiction on its own motion and determine the admissibility of a 
case when ‘the principles of due process recognized by international law’ 9  are not met.  
Admissibility consists of three components: complementarity, gravity of the crime and a state’s 
unwillingness or inability to carry out investigation or prosecution, but the Rome Statute does 
not state whether these components should be considered in any particular order. During the 
UN Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International 
Criminal Court, the Chinese delegation revealed its concern that ‘the Prosecutor’s right to 
conduct investigations without sufficient checks and balances against frivolous prosecution, 
was tantamount to the right to judge and rule on State conduct’.10 In the 2015 session of the 
Assembly of States Parties to the Rome Statute in 2015, the Chinese representative reiterated 
the necessity to prove that the ICC’s efforts were made ‘in compliance with the principle of 
complementarity’, and that the ICC must “perform its duties with greatest prudence.’11   
2.2 Judicial Complementarity or Competition? 
The Rome Statute respects states’ right to first prosecute crimes, and the ICC sticks to the 
principle to be ‘complementary to national criminal jurisdictions.’12  The interpretation and 
application of the complementarity principle can be controversial as well. As M. Cherif 
Bassiouni reflects, the concept of complementarity is not explicit, as its ‘premise of the 
existence of concurrent jurisdictional relationship between co-equal authoritative legal 
processes’ needs much articulation. 13  
                                                 
9 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (entered into force on 1 July 2002), Article 17 -2“ Issues of 
admissibility”, stable link: www.icc-cpi.int/nr/rdonlyres/ea9aeff7-5752-4f84-be94-
0a655eb30e16/0/rome_statute_english.pdf 
10 UN official records A/CONF.183/SR.9, Friday, 17 July 1998, page 124. 
11  Statement by GUO Xiaomei, Counselor of the Department of Treaty and Law of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
of China, China Observer Delegation, 18-26 November 2015, accessed 1 December 2015 via:https://www.icc-
cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/ASP14/GenDeb/ASP14-GenDeb--OS-China-ENG.pdf  
12 Rome Statute , supra note 9, Preamble and Article 1, “The Court”.  
13 Bassiouni, M. CHERIF (2003), Introduction to International Criminal Law, 2nd Revised Edition, Leiden: 
Koninklijke Brill NV,   page 19-21. 
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China’s official claims have been constantly reserved toward the role of ICC Prosecutor. Under 
the ICC’s authority, the Prosecutor has several powers, including proposing amendments to the 
Elements of Crimes and Rules of Procedure and Evidence;14 analysing the seriousness of the 
information sent by States, organs of the United Nations, intergovernmental or non-
governmental organizations, and other reliable sources; initiating investigations proprio motu 
on the basis of jurisdiction; and submitting new facts or evidence when an investigation request 
is refused by the Pre-Trial Chamber.15   
Beside this, the complementarity principle also means that the ICC should ‘provide assistance 
to a State Party conducting an investigation into or trial in respect of conduct which constitutes 
a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court or which constitutes a serious crime under the 
national law of the requesting State.’16 The Office of the Prosecutor pursued a strategy of 
developing partnership and dialogue with States, by ‘encouraging national action and 
promoting anti-impunity measures,’ and ‘providing direct assistance and advice …including 
exchanging information and evidence to facilitate a national investigation or prosecution, 
providing technical advice, and offering training to countries [to a certain extent].’17  
In spite of the mutually beneficial outlook underlying the strategic plan on judicial cooperation 
between the ICC and states,  the ICC’s operation often seems to proceed in a one-directional 
way, such as requesting cooperation from concerned States and other organizations rather than 
amplifying the existing judicial resources at the national level. In a report from the Office of the 
Prosecutor with regard to the case of Libya, ‘cooperation’ is explained as ‘all States and 
concerned regional and other international organizations cooperat[ing] fully with the Court and 
the Prosecutor’, and the Prosecutor ‘encourag[ing] partners to cooperate [as] fully as possible 
without unnecessary preconditions or restrictions to ensure the effectiveness of the 
investigation.’ 18  
Providing the fact that not every judicial system is up to the same standard, China emphatically 
raised the question of how to improve the national judicial system by cooperating with the ICC. 
In 1995, China requested that the then to-be-founded ICC should carefully settle “whether or 
how to render judicial assistance to the court or countries making such requests on a case by 
                                                 
14 Rome Statute , supra note 9, Article 9 “Elements of Crimes”, Article 51 “Rules of Procedure and Evidence. 
15 Rome Statute , supra note 9, Article 15 “Prosecutor”. 
16 Rome Statute , supra note 9, Article 93 “ Other forms of cooperation”. 
17 OTP, “Informal Expert Paper: The Principle of complementarity in Practice”, published 2013, accessed 17 June 
2015 via: www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/20BB4494-70F9-4698-8E30-
907F631453ED/281984/complementarity.pdf  
18 Fifth Report of the Prosecutor of the ICC to the UN Security Council, pursuant to UNSCR 1970(2011),  
accessed 17 June 2015 via: www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/otp/UNSC-report-Libya-May2013 -Eng.pdf   
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case basis.” 19  The Chinese delegation stated in 2013 that it expected the ICC to provide 
assistance to “further construct the state’s judicial capacity in order to better try individual 
cases.”20 More recently, China re-affirmed its preferred approach at 2013 Assembly of States 
Parties to the Rome Statute by stating “the Court should … encourage and support relevant 
states to exercise their jurisdictions over crimes, especially by strengthening judicial capacity 
building based on states’ judicial sovereignty.”21   
Furthermore,  pre-conditions of exercising the ICC’s complementary jurisdiction depends on 
the ICC professionals’ discretion as to whether ‘the [State’s] proceedings were not or are not 
being conducted independently or impartially, and they were or are being conducted in a 
manner which, in the circumstances, is inconsistent with an intent to bring the person 
concerned to justice.’22 This seemingly grants ICC the power to judge a sovereign state’s 
judicial quality, which is hardly acceptable to the Chinese government.23 
2.3  ICC Preoccupation in Africa 
Since ICC’s inception in July 2002, its targeting African state heads has provoked a strident 
criticism for acting with bias. The ICC disputed the criticism of selective prosecution and being 
subject to political influence, arguing that among the eight cases brought before the Court, only 
two were begun proprio motu, i.e. Kenya and Côte d'Ivoire, while the remaining six were either 
referred by the states themselves (Uganda, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Central African 
Republic and Mali) or by the UN Security Council (Darfur/Sudan and Libya). Another 
meritorious ICC argument is that ‘Africa has experienced a large number of atrocities, and 
statistically speaking, the rate of atrocity crimes committed on the continent would make it a 
natural focus for the Court.’24  
                                                 
19 China Permanent Mission of the People's Republic of China to the United Nations, 155 West 66th Street New 
York N.Y. 10023 (212) 870-0300, 30 October 1995, accessed 20 March 2014via: 
www.iccnow.org/documents/China1PrepCmt30Oct95.pdf. 
20 中华人民共和国外交部：《中国代表在联大全会阐述对国际刑事法院的立场》， 发表于 2013年 11月 4
日 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China: China’s Explaining Its Standpoint on the 
International Criminal Court to General Assembly of the UN, released 4 November 2013, accessed 17 June 2015 
via: www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_chn/wjbxw_602253/t1095440.shtml ). 
21 Statement by MA Xinmin, at the twelfth session of the Assembly of States Parties to Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court. 
22 Rome Statute , supra note 9, Article 17(2c). 
23 黄宏(2002):《国际刑事法院和国内法院在刑事司法管辖权上的关系》，载于《国际关系学院学报》，第 6
期，页 28-29 (HUANG Hong (2002), “Criminal Jurisdictional Relation between the International Criminal Court 
and National Courts,” Journal of the University of International Relations, No.6, page 28-29). 
24 Max du PLESSIS et al (2013), “Africa and the International Criminal Court”, International Law, Chatham 
House, July, accessed 13 March 2015 via: 
http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/public/Research/International%20Law/0713pp_iccafrica.p
df. 
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However China frequently questions the ICC’s prudence in its selection of cases primarily 
based on two considerations: first that the ICC seems to reinforce the concern that the current 
international system discriminates against less powerful states, and second that the supra-
national legal proceedings may constitute serious impediments to conflict resolution and peace-
building process in Africa. At the preparatory conference, the Chinese delegations 
demonstrated their worries as to whether the ICC could operate in an independent and fair way, 
and recently in the 2013 Assembly of States Parties to Rome Statue, China reiterated the 
necessity to strengthen ICC’s fairness so that ‘no distinction should be made to different parties 
in every step of the proceedings of the Court, from situation referral, investigation to trial of a 
case or compensation stage. Any double standard, selective enforcement of law or selective 
justice is a violation and betrayal of justice itself.’25 
The former ICC Prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo pursued a vigorous program of investigation 
in Africa, but failed to examine both sides sufficiently, which leads to an image of the ICC’s 
partiality.26 Given that the situation in Kenya is ‘relatively small-scale violent when compared 
to other situations such as Sudan and the Democratic Republic of Congo,’27 the Prosecutor did 
not focus enough on the gravity of asserted crimes and it led to a problematic image of being 
biased in selecting cases. Later it was noted that some African states ‘take the view that they 
have been singularly targeted in the indictment and arrest of their officials and that the exercise 
of universal jurisdiction by European states is politically selective against them.’28  
In addition, the ICC’s presence in Africa conflict areas raises a fundamental debate on peace 
versus justice. The ICC’s presence in Uganda appeared unwelcomed by both Uganda president 
29 and local civil society leaders30 given the fact that the ICC neither delivered justice to the 
victims of the conflict, nor facilitated the peace talks between government and rebellion leaders. 
Although Article 16 on ‘Deferral of Investigation and Prosecution’ acknowledges the UN 
                                                 
25 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China ( n 21), statement by MA Xinmin. 
26 Claude E. WELCH Jr. and Ashley F. WATKINS (2011), “Extending Enforcement: The Coalition for the 
International Criminal Court”, Human Rights Quarterly, Vol.33, page 1006. 
27 Chandra Lekha SRIRAM and Stephen BROWN (2012), “Kenya in the Shadow of the ICC: Complementarity, 
Gravity and Impact,” International Criminal Law Review . Vol 12, page 222. 
28 Council of the European Union, The AU-EU Expert Report on the Principle of Universal Jurisdiction, 16 April 
2009, Para. 34, accessed via: http://www.africa-eu-
partnership.org/sites/default/files/documents/rapport_expert_ua_ue_competence_universelle_en_0.pdf. 
29 For instance, President Museveni stated that “[t]he state could withdraw its case [in the ICC” if leaders of the 
Lord’s Resistance Army(LRA) could cease fighting and “engage in internal reconciliation mechanisms put in 
place by the Acholi community such as mataput or blood settlement”, as reported by the New Vision newspaper, 
which is believed close to the government, released 15 November 2004., accessed 20 March 2014 via: 
www.iccnow.org/documents/AI-Ugandapressrel_16Nov04.pdf 
30 Marlies GLASIUS, “What is Global Justice and Who Decides? Civil Society and Victim  Responses to the 
International Criminal Court’s Frist Investigation,” the Human Rights Quarterly, Vol. 31, NO. 2, May 2009, page 
508 
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Security Council’s authority to suspend investigations or prosecutions for renewable one-year 
periods if they are deemed to pose a threat to peace and security, both the ICC and the UN 
Security Council have not shown the interest in employing these escape clauses.31 To date, the 
ICC has never suspended an investigation and prosecution at the request of the concerned state 
or international organizations. This invites some skepticism that the ICC can complicate 
domestic issues in a certain state, which contradicts the objective of development and peace 
pursed by African societies. 
3. REVEALING DISCREPANCY BETWEEN CHINA AND THE ICC 
Despite much normative pressure concerning China’s reaction to the ICC in particular and 
international criminal justice in general, there is no sign that the Chinese government will sign 
the Rome Statute in the foreseeable future. This part offers an explanatory perspective that 
analyzes three considerations that play a significant role in formulating the Chinese diplomatic 
principles and China’s stance toward the ICC.  
3.1 State Integrity: Political Bedrock of Chinese Foreign Policy 
State integrity in this part refers to a recognition that the state – and along with the system of 
the state – are entitled to exert primary jurisdiction and it is to be respected by other states 
under international law. It is perhaps helpful to briefly summarize how China as a state actor 
experienced being part of the international system, before a discussion on various 
interpretations on supra-national judicial organ begins.  
Notwithstanding a critical attitude of the history of Western imperial hegemony, China saw an 
increased interest in joining the Western-led international system in the early twentieth century 
when then Chinese elites were enormously anxious about China’s weakness and 
underdevelopment. In the last decade of the nineteenth century, mainstream intellectuals were 
convinced that only by developing national institutions following the exemplary experience of 
Japan, West Europe and North America, could China ameliorate its declining fate and revive 
itself as a competent player in the modern international arena.32  
One of the attempts was to get acquainted with how the international legal framework worked. 
After the seclusive Imperial Dynasty ended in 1912, Chinese Republican governments begun to 
speed up the pace to accede to multilateral treaties. The first international treaty signed by 
Chinese Republican government was the International Opium Convention on 23 January 1912 
in The Hague, in response to the increasing domestic consensus against the opium trade that 
                                                 
31 Victor PESKIN(2009), “Caution and Confrontation in the International Criminal Court’s Pursuit of 
Accountability in Uganda and Sudan”, Human Rights Quarterly, August, Vol. 31, No. 3,  page 680-81. 
32 William P. ALFORD (1992), “Making A Goddess of Democracy from Loose Sand: Thoughts on Human Rights 
in the People’s Republic of China,” Human Rights in Cross-Cultural Perspectives: A Quest For Consensus,  edited 
by Abdullahi Ahmei An-Naím, University of Pennsylvania Press, page 71-72. 
Volume 11, No. 4 
10 
 
severely damaged both Chinese economy and demographic quality in the second half of the 
19th century. China as a victor in the First World War had a strong intention to sign the 1919 
Treaty of Versailles, hoping that they would regain the sovereign control over the German 
concessions on China’s Shandong peninsula. However, with British and French representatives 
supporting the Japanese delegation at the Paris Peace Conference, the Allied victors agreed to 
Japan’s takeover of Shandong in Article 156 of the Treaty of Versailles, that ‘Germany 
renounces, in favour of Japan, all her rights, title and privileges particularly those concerning 
the territory of Jiaozhou, railways, mines and submarine cables [in Shandong].’33  
When the strategy of ‘seeking for self-evident justice from international society’ proved 
unsuccessful, the intellectuals lost their confidence in their Western ‘teachers’ and instead 
advocated for patriotic spirits which bloomed nationwide after the famous ‘May Fourth 
Movement’ in 1919. Not surprisingly, ‘standing up as an independent country’ was thrilling to 
the whole population when the Communist Party of China’s (CPC) declared the foundation of 
People’s Republic of China in 1949. Nationalism has been incorporated within public 
conceptions in China. To some extent, the CPC’s legitimacy is built upon their competency to 
free Chinese society from external intervention. ‘The Road of Rejuvenation’, a permanent 
exhibition at the National Museum of China in Beijing, reminds visitors of the 1840s’ Opium 
War and the follow-on fate of China becoming a semi-independent nation. Nationalist thinking 
extended in the 1990s when China’s economy prospered in the global market, expecting the 
world to show their respects to China – a great nation with a ‘large size and population, long 
history and legacy.’34  In addition, ideological confrontations after the Second World War 
discouraged China from a broad interaction with most UN-related bodies and treaties until the 
1970s. 
Even though China adjusted its stance toward the international system after the normalization 
of Sino-American diplomacy pushed by Henry Kissinger’s secret mission to Beijing in 1971, it 
did not mean the Chinese policymakers conceded all the old norms encapsulated in the state 
integrity. The Chinese government was not prepared to replace these norms with universalistic 
values originating from abroad, especially after the 1980s’ popular cognitive wave of the post-
Orientalism that criticizes the Eurocentric concepts35 Intellectual work and education in China 
have somehow contributed to a trend of ‘national rejuvenation’. To some extent, Chinese youth 
generations are influenced by the patriotic and nationalist education. Western imperialist 
                                                 
33 Section VIII Shantung, The Versailles Treaty (entered into force on 20 January 1920), full text accessed 7 
January 2016 via: http://avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/partiv.asp 
34 Evan S. MEDEIROS (2009), “China’s International Behavior: Activism, Opportunism and Diversification”, 
China’s Foreign Policy Outlook, page 9-11, accessed 12 December 2015 via:  
www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2009/RAND_MG850.pdf  .  
35 Reza AFSHARI (2015), “Relativity in Universality: Jack Donnelly’s Grant Theory in Need of Specific 
Illustrations,” Human Rights Quarterly, November Vol. 37, No. 4, page  875-76. 
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history is actively present in China’s contemporary discourse, and independent jurisdiction free 
from supra-national criticism and correction is a notable component to that perception.  
According to China’s philosophy on foreign relations, states’ mutual respect for integrity holds 
a moral aspect - however small or underdeveloped a state is, its consent should be respected. 
Chinese diplomats have been proud about the morality reflected by their reaction that ‘we are 
opposed to the big bullying the small, but we also believe that the small must not make troubles 
out of nothing. We should respect each other.’36 In short, an absolute state integrity free from 
external interventions is deemed to be a political bedrock for Chinese policymakers and a 
legitimate claim for the general public. The idea that intentional justice can surpass state 
integrity under some circumstances has not become well-known in Chinese discourse.  
3.2 Judicial Reforms: An Ongoing Agenda in China 
Chinese leaders allegedly strive to modify the equilibrium between executive and legislative 
powers, and declare to build an independent judiciary – though under the CPC’s supervision – 
in order to prevent arbitrariness of officials and protect rights of individuals. The Supreme 
People’s Court initiated a series of judicial reforms in the 1980s, ‘crossing a river by touching 
rocks under the water.’37 In 1988 a national court conference decided that law – rather than 
politics - should regulate both the trail and prosecution.  
Yet, China is still an ‘infant” in terms of its judicial developmental stage. Judicial professionals 
independent from the state executive branch were unheard of until the late 1980s when the 
Ministry of Justice started to make a law aiming to regulate the legal profession. On 1 July 
1995 the first Judges’ Law of China came into effect, followed by the first Lawyers’ Law of 
China effected on 15 March 1996. Reforms of formal legal institutions triggered a shift in the  
public perception of role of law - the term ‘legal practitioners’ begun replacing the former one 
‘state legal workers’ and professional ethics of legal practitioners - such as independence – 
started flourishing in the 1990s. 
In the context of judicial experiments and reform measures taken by the Chinese government, 
will the involvement with transnational and supranational judicial organs complement China’s 
domestic endeavours for justice? As far as China’s own experience is concerned, the answer 
seems to be no. Former top state Chinese leaders were facing investigation by the Spanish 
National Court in 2006. The already existing suspicion about jurisdiction transcending 
sovereignty was deepened afterwards, because the accusation did not take other remedies with 
‘Chinese characteristics’ into consideration. 
                                                 
36 Chinese Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hua Chunying's Regular Press Conference, June 12, 2014, accessed via: 
http://www.mfa.gov.cn/mfa_chn/fyrbt_602243/jzhsl_602247/t1164973.shtml 
37 夏锦文 (2010)：《当代中国的司法改革：成就、问题与出路——以人民法院为中心的分析》，载于《中国
法学》，第 1期，页 17-18. (XIA Jinwen (2010), “Achievements, Problems and Solutions of Judicial Reforms in 
Contemporary China, ” China Legal Science, Vol. 1,  page 17-18). 
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The judicial system in Tibet is far from developed – as discussed above, the national judicial 
system was rather underdeveloped before the 1980s when the judicial reforms aiming to 
establish a professional and independent judiciary in China were launched. During the 
transitional period, many grievances were addressed through non-judicial channels, such as 
executive-led petitioning mechanisms and grassroots customary mediation. The Spanish 
National Court came to the conclusion that no remedy existed before the Chinese courts with 
respect to the alleged crimes fails to clarify whether individual cases of brutality can be trialed 
in other legal regimes including the petition system, or Letters and Visits, that deals with a 
broad range of administrative and criminal complaints. Moreover, it did not take into regard 
that the Chinese government has made efforts to build an accessible court system in Tibet - for 
example, a legal assistance network is being built in Tibet in order to allocate Tibetan-speaking 
lawyers free-of-charge. As of June 2013, the network covered 73 counties and assisted 6,687 
civil and criminal cases.38 Putting the Spanish judicial approach aside, there is another fear that 
the prosecution initiated by transnational or supranational judicial bodies will not only convey 
an impression that the Chinese judicial system is incompetent and unfair, but also likely 
intensify the separatist movements in Tibet Autonomous Region and Xinjiang Uyghur 
Autonomous Region.39  
China opposes resolutions of any kind that would give an international organization the right to 
‘judge and rule on State conduct,’ and insists that ‘each state shoulders the primary 
responsibility to protect its own population. However, internal unrest in a country is often 
caused by complex factors. Prudence is called for in judging a government's ability and will to 
protect its citizens. No reckless intervention should be allowed.’ 40  Then-vice-president Xi 
Jinping made a comment while touring South America in 2009, that ‘there are a few foreigners, 
with full bellies, who have nothing better to do than try to point fingers at our country. … 
China does not export revolution, hunger, poverty, nor does China cause you any headaches. 
What else do you want?’41 Xi’s statement is regarded as a deliberate strategy taken by the CPC, 
which highlights the state’s supreme role in improving national institutions and settling 
domestic affairs.42   
                                                 
38  Data from Chinese Central News Agency Xinhua, 17 July 2013,  accessed 17 June 2015 via: 
www.gov.cn/jrzg/2013-07/17/content_2449948.htm  
39 Joel WUTHNOW (2012), “China and the ICC”, The Diplomat, published 7 December, accessed 17 December 
2015 via: thediplomat.com/2012/12/china-and-the-icc . 
40 Position Paper of the People's Republic of China on the United Nations Reforms, released June 2005,  accessed 
17 December 2014 via: www.iccnow.org/documents/China_PositionPaperUNReforms_7Jun05.pdf  
41 张广昭，陈振凯：《习近平：内政外交新思路》，载于《人民日报（海外版）》，2013年 4月 5日, 第 
01 版(ZHANG Guangzhou, CHEN Zhenkai, “Xi Jiping: New Thoughts on Domestic and Foreign Affairs,” 
People’s Daily (overseas edition), page 01, 5 April 2013, accessed 20 March 2015 via: 
paper.people.com.cn/rmrbhwb/html/2013-04/05/content_1221580.htm). 
42 陈彦(2006):《民族主义诱惑与认同危机》，载于《当代中国研究》，第 1期（总第 92期）,页 6 (CHEN 
Yan(2006), “Temptation of Nationalism and Crisis of Identity”, Modern China Studies, Issue 1, page 6, accessed 
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3.3 African Partnerships: Non-conditionality in Effect 
China’s important role in Africa is being strengthened in the past two decades. The Chinese 
government expanded its traditional relationships with African states to secure energy supplies 
from such oil fields as Sudan, Algeria, Nigeria, Chad and Congo. After the China-Africa 
Cooperation Forum was established in 2000, China vigorously promoted its trade and 
investment with 44 African countries. As of 2014, the Sino-African trade amounted to $ 222 
billion - 21 times the sum in the year 2000 –making China the biggest trading partner to Africa 
for the sixth consecutive year. In comparison, European trade with Africa totaled $137 billion 
in 2013.43 China’s presence in Africa is sometimes criticised for doing ‘business-only’, as it 
agreed to accept the political status quo in African states in exchange for stable supplies.44 
This is just one way to describe the Sino-African relations. China likes to phrase itself as an 
‘old friend’ to Africa, who has complied with the non-conditionality principle concerning 
official assistance for African states since 1956. As a matter of fact, China’s non-conditionality 
principle applies in both political and economic fields. When Talisman Energy, the second 
largest Canadian oil company at the time, announced in 2003 to sell its share of the Greater 
Nile Petroleum Operating Company that manages petro exploration and production in Sudan, 
the Chinese government did not interfere with the business negotiation to favour the state-run 
Chinese National Petroleum Corporation, and in the end, an Indian Company, ONGC Videsh, 
bought Talisman’s 25% share. 
At the official-policy level, China prefers international moderation including UN negotiation 
and multilateral dialogue over litigious and military actions, which adheres to the 1954 Five 
Principles of Peaceful Coexistence.45 China is in many respects skeptical of involving the ICC 
in African affairs. China conveyed in 2009 that “we should not fail to see that if the peace 
process is blocked, justice would be castles in the air. Therefore, the ICC, while doing its 
judicial work independently and endeavouring to end impunity, has to consider the larger 
picture of world peace and security.46 In an interview with Rwandan newspaper The New Times 
                                                                                                                    
15 December 2015 via: http://www.modernchinastudies.org/cn/issues/past-issues/91-mcs-2006-issue-1/941-2012-
01-05-15-35-10.html). 
43 《中非合作论坛 15年 2020年中非贸易额将达 4000亿美元》, 载于《人民日报》2015年 12月 04日, 记
者周素雅 （Data source: ZHOU Suya, “15 Years of  Forum on China-Africa Cooperation”, People’s Daily, 
published 4 December 2015）. 
44 Amy Myers Jaffe and Steven W. Lewis (2002), “Beijing's Oil Diplomacy”, Survival, Vol.44, Issue 1, page  115-
16. 
45 The Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence is seen as an overarching guideline for China’s diplomatic policy-
making, that refers to: mutual respect for each other’s territorial integrity and sovereignty, mutual non-aggression, 
mutual non-interference in each other’s internal affairs, equality and cooperation for mutual benefits, and peaceful 
co-existence.  
46  Statement by XU Hong, Head of Chinese Delegation, at the General Debate of the Eighth Session of the 
Assembly of States Parties to the Rome Statute of ICC, 20 November 2009,  accessed 17 December 2014 via: 
www.iccnow.org/documents/ICC-ASP-ASP8-GenDeba-China-ENG.pdf  
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in March 2013, Lu Shaye, Director-General of Department of African Affairs of China’s 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, responded to China’s non-conditionality principle that ‘no state in 
Africa wants conditions levied on its domestic affairs, … it is an invalid censure that China 
neglects the benefits of African people because the assistance and construction projects China 
has provided for African states are proven to improve the economic and social  development in 
Africa, which is what the people in Africa really need.’47 China officially does not consider the 
African states as using power against the interests of the people, and prudently avoids putting 
itself in a contentious position between the African state leaders and the ICC. 
 In a formal conversation with a Japanese delegation in March 1985, Deng Xiaoping shared his 
judgment that peace and development were cruxes of challenges faced by human societies, and 
development was the key aspect. Deng Xiaoping further concluded that ‘China is no less 
concerned about the conflicting and unstable situations of today’s world. In fact China would 
plea for at least two decades of a peaceful environment so that any domestic development plan 
can be executed.’48 In other words, development is understood as a powerful tool to settle many 
problems faced by African societies.  
The international community has higher expectations of China, and China passionately portrays 
itself as a peace-loving and mild power in order to enjoy a favourable geopolitical environment. 
Supporting the ICC does not seem to add much value to China’s advocacy of being a mild big 
power, nor does it suit China’s long-claimed diplomatic principles.  
As of today, intellectual inquiries have not disclosed much about how the Chinese public view 
the functioning and legitimacy of the ICC. The challenge from examining public conception is 
formidable in any society, which is often too abstract to detect. Alternatively, communication 
studies have convincingly suggested that people visualize remote institutions through print-
language.49 It is empirically evident that news media attempt to present multiple ideas and 
create a public platform with conscious neutrality.50 Hence news discourse is one of the best 
possible approximations to public conception in the society. 
                                                 
47  “非洲司司长卢沙野接受中非新闻交流中心记者采访实录”(Minutes of Interview with Director-General of 
Department of African Affairs LU Shaye, 3 March 2014, accessed 13 August 2015 via: 
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_chn/wjbxw_602253/t1133676.shtml  ) . 
48 《《和平与发展是当代世界的两大问题》，1985年 3月 4日， 载于《邓小平文选》第三卷，人民出版社, 
1993年 10月第 1版, 页 104-106(DEGN Xiaoping, “Peace and Development Constitute Today’s Two World 
Challenges,” Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, People’s Press, Vol. 3, October 1993, the 1st edition,   page 104-
106). 
49 Benedict ANDERSON (1991), Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism, 
first published by Verso 1983, revised and extended edition published by Verso 1991, page 62, 77.  
50 Jürgen HABERMAS (translated by Thomas Burger with the assistance of Frederick Lawrence) (1991), The 
Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry Into a Category of Bourgeois Society , MIT Press, page 
171-72. 
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Chinese news media used to be merely arms of the government until a large-scale media 
commercialization starting in the early 1990s. Chinese media have been shifting to commercial 
institutions that need to carefully balance popular appeal and official interests so as to maintain 
their competitiveness in the market. An examination on news discourse produced by Chinese 
media allows us to capture public opinions in China.  
The corpora computed below are retrieved from the WiseNews, the world’s largest database on 
Chinese news. The WiseNews monitors and captures update-to-the-minute news from a wide 
range of newspapers, magazines, journals and news agencies reporting on China. The datasets 
are selected from 1,303 Chinese-language news outlets produced by Chinese media.51 52.8% 
are from newspapers, 44.5% from website news, 1.5 % from news agencies and 1.2 % from 
news magazines.  
The search aim is to cover as many relevant texts as possible so that the result can be reflective 
enough of general perception in China. Disjunction (“or”) is therefore chosen as the search 
logic that means if one or more search terms are captured from the headline, lead or body of a 
certain text, the text will be included in the result. The search range starts on 1st January 1998 
from when the WiseNews provides full texts of the news, to 1st May 2016. Three groups of 
search terms are used, namely,  
Group one: international criminal court, Hague international criminal court, Rome statute, 
international criminal court statute, International criminal court Rome statute;52 
Group two: international criminal court and China, Hague international criminal court and 
China, Rome statute and China, international criminal court statute and China, International 
criminal court Rome statute and China;53 
And Group three: international criminal court and Africa, Hague international criminal court 
and Africa, Rome statute and Africa, international criminal court statute and Africa, 
International criminal court Rome statute and Africa.54 
The final result consists of 1,327 news texts which amount to 93,000 words. In accordance with 
the scientific norms developed by corpus analysists, the linguistic computation is conducted by 
the analytical software called AntConc that discovers statistically reliable qualities of the large-
                                                 
51 Data Source: Content List of ‘Wisers Informaiton Portal’, updated on 28 July 2016, accessed 4 August 2016 via: 
http://libwisesearch.wisers.net.eproxy2.lib.hku.hk/WISENEWS-SHARED/wortal/docs/content.pdf . 
52 The search is done in simplified Chinses: 国际刑事法院/海牙国际刑事法院/罗马规约/rome statute/国际刑事
法院规约/国际刑事法院罗马规约. 
53 The search is done in simplified Chinses: 国际刑事法院+中国/海牙刑事法院+中国/罗马规约+中国/rome 
statute+中国/国际刑事法院规约+中国/国际刑事法院罗马规约+中国. 
54 The search is done in simplified Chinses: 国际刑事法院罗马规约国际刑事法院+非洲/海牙刑事法院+非洲/
罗马规约+非洲/rome statute+非洲/国际刑事法院规约+非洲/国际刑事法院罗马规约+非洲. 
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scale textual objects. The ‘collocation model is chosen to process the statistically likely 
collocations surrounding a particular concept. 
Excluding meaningless words from collocation analysis results, the first target ‘court’ is 
frequently associated with ‘accountability (or fuzezhi/负责制)’, and ‘ideal (or lixiang/理想)’. 
This result implies that Chinese news discourse stresses on the accountability question and an 
idealist nature when reporting on the ICC. At the academic level, a number of Chinese scholars 
of international law have noticed that it remains one of China’s top concerns that the ICC is 
short of a sufficient institutional check to hold the Prosecutor accountable for his/her exercise 
of investigative and prosecutorial power.55 It is deemed unrealistic to regard the ICC as a sole 
emanation of the Rome Statute and overlook the impact of big powers on international criminal 
justice as “the successful stories of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda have shown the importance of 
political support in seeking for criminal justice.”56 
Meaningful keywords collocated to the target word ‘sovereignty’ include ‘ideology (or sixiang/
思想)’ , ‘independence (or duli zizhu/独立自主)’, ‘impeaching (or you sun/有损)’, ‘defending 
(or hanwei/捍卫)’ and ‘power politics (or qiangquan zhengzhi/强权政治)’. This type of 
linguistic combinations suggests that Chinese news discourse tends to link the sovereignty issue 
to contentious annotations. In light of China’s exposure to the outer world full of unequal 
international treaties in the nineteenth century, Chinese are traditionally in some way critical of 
Western powers. A book comparing Chinese and Ethiopian societies has been widely read by 
Chinese scholars of African studies since the 1930s, which concludes that ‘both suffered from 
capitalist invasions and the decline of handicraft industries, and both were victims of 
imperialism.’57 The sovereignty issue is contextually understood and interpreted among the 
Chinese public, which has been long related with the colonial history in China as well as in 
Africa.  
As to the target word ‘jurisdiction’, meaningful results are shown as following: ‘wise (or 
mingzhi/明智)’, ‘withdraw (or chehui/撤回)’, ‘exhaustion (or qiongjin/穷尽)’, ‘compromise (or 
zhinan ertui/知难而退)’, ‘inconsistency (or youwei/有违)’and ‘defend (or hanwei/捍卫)’.  The 
first-ranked key word of ‘wise’ is surprising as it is the first time that news discourse on the 
                                                 
55  JIA Bingbing (2006), “China and the International Criminal Court: The Current Situation,” Singapore Year 
Book of International Law, Vol. 10 SYBIL1-11, page 91. 
56 杨柳(2013)：《国际刑事法院检察官面临的政治与法律难题及其策略》，载于《环球法律评论》，第 3期，
页 164 (YANG Liu (2013), “Political and Legal Dilemma Faced by ICC Prosecutor and Its Solution,” Global Law 
Review, Vol. 3, page 164). 
57 李安山(2006)：《20世纪中国的非洲研究》，载于《国际政治研究》，第 4期，页 111 (LI Anshan (2006), 
“African Studies in China in the Twentieth Century: A Historiographical Survey,” African Studies Review, Vol. 4,  
page 111). 
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ICC appears to be positive. However, upon a cross-examination of the original corporal, the 
description ‘wise’ is used to refer to the fact that in 2004 the US withdrew its demand from the 
UN Security Council aiming to exempt American citizens from jurisdiction of the ICC.58   
In short, Chinese news discourse on the ICC indicates some kind of scepticism especially when 
relating to the checked functioning of the ICC, and the sovereignty and jurisdiction issues.  
4. SEEKING SYNERGY BETWEEN CHINA AND THE ICC 
Having analyzed China’s three primary concerns over the ICC, and the contextual rationale 
behind them, this part reflects upon a few trends that are likely to result in a shift in China’s 
attitude to the ICC. From a rationalist point of view, a state’s behaviours on the international 
scene are the result of calculations of potential costs and interests, and it is thus nearly pointless 
to ask whether China’s statements relating the ICC are genuine. It perhaps makes more sense to 
uncover the interaction between the ICC and China that is likely to safeguard international 
justice, and at the same time also match China’s ambition to rise as a responsible power 
internationally and develop a fair judicial system nationally.  
First of all, China has been renowned for its pragmatism on the international stage, and this 
characteristic is reflected in many official positions with regard to international criminal justice. 
As a matter of fact, China was active during the Rome Statute negotiations in the mid-1990s. 
After the UN General Assembly, in its Resolution 44/39, requested the International Law 
Commission to address the question of establishing an international criminal court in 1989, the 
Chinese delegation made 33 comments 59  in the form of recommendations, statements, 
proposals and joint proposals concerning the establishment and operation of the proposed court. 
China had hoped to enhance its influence on international affairs.60  
China felt urgently to be broadly immersed in the international regime that could regulate and 
protect cross-border actions with modernization and globalization listed on the national agenda. 
Consequently, Chinese engagement with international treaty bodies became deeper and broader 
in the 1980s, as shown in the Figure 1 below. 
                                                 
58《外交部发言人就国际刑事法院管辖权问题表示 美撤回决议草案是明智的》，载于《人民日报（海外
版）》， 2004-06-25，04 版| 要闻·社会（“Ministry of Foreign Affairs Commenting ‘US Wisely Withdrew its 
Resolution Draft’ ”, People’ Daily (overseas edition), 25 June 2004, page 04, “Current affairs”）. 
59  This calculation is based on  key-word searches in two databases – the ICC Legal Tools and the Coalition for 
the ICC.  
60  陈东晓 (2014)：《中国的“主场外交”：机遇、挑战和任务》，载于《国际问题研究》, 第 5期, 页 7-
8(CHEN Dongxiao (2014),  “China's ‘home diplomacy’: Opportunities, Challenges and Tasks”,  China 
International Studies, Issue 5, page 7-8) . 




Participation of China in Internationally Binding Treaties61 
Moreover, the Chinese government tends to test the so-called ‘proactive diplomacy’ and to 
raise its voice together with other Third-World counties in the 21st century. With regard to the 
construction of international justice norms, it is observed that the guiding concept for China’s 
diplomatic policies is already experiencing a significant switch. Chinese President Xi Jinping 
advocated on many high-profile occasions for a new interpretation of Chinese diplomatic 
philosophy, that “justice and interests are intertwined, and we cannot achieve any of them 
unless a fair balance is made.”62 In June 2015, China’s Minister of Foreign Affairs Wang Yi 
interpreted ‘a New Journey of China's Diplomacy’ as being ‘the time when people believed 
“power is truth” has gone, China is willing to carry forward the justice and pursue shared 
benefits in today’s world.’63 Some Chinese scholars are already concerned that as a non-State 
Party to the ICC, China cannot enjoy some rights exclusively entitled to the state parties, 
including being substantively involved in the process of discussing and defining the crime of 
aggression, and nominating candidates for ICC judges and prosecutors who must be nationals 
of the state party, 64  further leaving the authority of constructing international criminal 
jurisprudence to China’s counterparts.  
                                                 
61 Data source: United Nations Treaty Collection, accessed 14 December 2015 via: 
https://treaties.un.org/ats/TreatyParticipantSearch.aspx?tab=UN. “Participation” in this database refers to action 
types of acceptance, signature, ratification and definitely signature.  
62  习近平：《在国际关系中践行正确义利》，2014年 07月 04日，新华网北京电 (XI Jinping, “Excursing 
Righteous Concept of Justice and Interests in International Relations”, Xinhua News Agency, 4 July 2014, accessed 
via:http://news.xinhuanet.com/world/2014-07/04/c_126710815.htm ) 
63  WANG Yi: Correct Viewpoint of Righteousness and Benefit Is the Common Value Pursued by Both China and 
Africa, released 15 January 2015, accessed 10 June 2015 via: 
www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1228846.shtml  
64  LU Jianping and WANG Zhixiang (2005), “China’s Attitude Towards the ICC,” Journal of International 
Criminal Justice, July, Vol. 3,  page 619-20. 
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Secondly, with China’s domestic reforms originating from the late 1970s, China valued 
concrete development plans over ideological contradiction in its policy-making process. 
Contemporary Chinese policy-makers are seen as ‘highly institutionalized based on standard 
rules and professionalized personnel’.65 Consequently, the objectives of Sino-African relations 
also changed – as Chinese scholars agreed, ‘the focus is adjusted from that “economy serves 
diplomacy” to the other way around after 1978.’66 Interestingly enough, China’s assentation on 
absolute state integrity free from supranational inference is already less static in the recent 
years. When violence in Sudan was escalating and spilling across the border into neighbouring 
Chad in 2006, international pressure was mounting on China to play a constructive role in the 
humanitarian crisis in Darfur. There were signs that China had pressured corresponding 
government at different levels. For instance, in February 2007 former President Hu Jintao 
visited Khartoum and reportedly pressured Sudanese President Omar Hassan al-Bashir to 
cooperate with the United Nations and permit the deployment of a UN peacekeeping force in 
Darfur.67  
Besides this, China voted in favour of the UN Security Council resolution to refer the Libyan 
case to the ICC, because ‘China was very much concerned about the situation in Libya. The 
greatest urgency was to cease the violence, to end the bloodshed and civilian casualties, and to 
resolve the crisis through peaceful means, such as dialogue.’ 68  This vote and statement 
surprised many observers as in the past China had rarely moved away from its longstanding 
foreign policy based on non-intervention. In its official explanation on China’s vote of 
abstention on the UN Resolution 1973 which authorized the creation of a no-fly zone over 
Libya and the bombing of ground targets69, China asserted that it ‘always opposes the use of 
force in international relations … In the meantime, China attaches great importance to the 
decision made by the 22-member Arab League on the establishment of a no-fly zone over 
                                                 
65 沈大伟 著、黄语生 译：《中国外交 60年变迁》，载于《当代中国史研究,》，2010年 1月第 17卷第 1
期，第 117页.  (David Shambaugh, translated by HUANG Yusheng (2010) : Transition in 60-Year Foreign 
Policies of China , Contemporary China History Studies,  Jan., Vol. 17, No. 1,  page 117). 
66  李安山：《论中国对非洲政策的调试与转变》，载于《西亚非洲》2006年第 8期，第 15-16页。(LI 
Anshan (2006), “On the Adjustment and Tranformation of China’s African Policy”, West Asia and Africa, Issue 8,   
page 15-16). 
67 Jonathan E. DAVIS (2011), “From Ideology to Pragmatism: China’s Position on Humanitarian Intervention in 
the Post-Cold War Era”, Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law, March . Issue 44,  page 269. 
68 Situation Referred to International Criminal Court; Secretary-General Expresses Hope Message ‘Heard and 
Heeded’ in Libya, Security Council 6491st Meeting, released 26 February 2011,  accessed 17 December 2014 via: 
www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2011/sc10187.doc.htm  
69 Resolution 1973 (2011) , Adopted by the Security Council at its 6498th meeting, on 17 March 2011, accessed 
via: http://www.nato.int/nato_static/assets/pdf/pdf_2011_03/20110927_110311-UNSCR-1973.pdf . 
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Libya. We also attach great importance to the positions of African countries and the African 
Union.’70 China’s international image struck a high after this 2011 vote of abstention. 
Furthermore, now that material importation from Africa - including crude oil, iron, metals and 
commodities - is progressively important for Chinese economy, a better socio-political 
environment in Africa is in China’s own interest. Challenges faced by African countries - 
armed conflicts, corruption, and the deteriorating environment, just to name a few - affect 
Chinese strategic interests to a large extent. In 2011 alone, 35,000 Chinese workers had to 
evacuate from Libya when the conflict worsened, and many oil exploration facilities became 
targets of attack in Sudan, Nigeria and Ethiopia in the past decade.71 It is hence reasonable to 
expect some shift in China’s balance between acknowledging the ICC’s jurisdiction and 
sticking to the supremacy of state sovereignty.  
Thirdly, the power structure of the international community is under a significant transition. 
There is ample evidence for China to relieve its deeply-rooted suspicion about the international 
system subject to Western powers’ preferred agenda. The U.S., for instance, declared to the UN 
Security Council that they would not take part in any peacekeeping action organized by UN 
unless the ICC granted U.S. citizens immunity from prosecution on 19 June 2002. In an effort 
to shield U.S. citizens, the U.S. government sought for bilateral non-surrender agreements, or 
‘Article 98’ agreements, which meant to preclude current and former U.S. government officials, 
military, and other personnel (regardless of whether or not they are nationals of the state 
concerned) as well as U.S. nationals from ICC’s prosecution.72 The attempt was unsuccessful. 
Fifty-three ICC States Parties resisted signing the Article 98 agreements, despite the U.S.’s 
threat of imposing large economic penalties. In addition, several intergovernmental bodies 
publicly opposed the Article 98 agreements and encouraged states to uphold the integrity of the 
Rome Statute.73 
A 2014 decision from the Office of the Prosecutor indicates that the ICC was trying hard to be 
independent from the political pressures of big powers. It re-opened the preliminary 
examination on alleged crimes attributed to the armed forces of the United Kingdom deployed 
in Iraq between 2003 and 2008.74 Though in the foreseeable future, the ICC is unlikely to 
                                                 
70 Explanation of Vote by Ambassador LI Baodong after Adoption of Security Council Resolution on Libya, 17 
March 2011, accessed via: http://www.china-un.org/eng/gdxw/t807544.htm . 
71 克里斯•阿尔登, 张春等：《非洲冲突后重建：中国日益增长的作用》，载于《国际展望》，2011年第 6
期，第 103页(Chris ALDEN, ZHANG Chun et al (2011), “China’s Growing Role in African Post-Conflict 
Reconstruction”, Global Review, Issue 6,   page 103). 
72  Status of US Bilateral Immunity Agreements, Coalition for the International Criminal Court,  accessed 6 May 
2014 via: www.iccnow.org/documents/CICCFS_BIAstatus_current.pdf  
73  Supra note 72, Status of US Bilateral Immunity Agreements, Coalition for the International Criminal Court. 
74 The ICC statement: Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, Fatou Bensouda, re-opens the preliminary 
examination of the situation in Iraq, 13/05/2014,  accessed 10 January 2015 via: www.icc-
cpi.int/en_menus/icc/press%20and%20media/press%20releases/ s/otp-statement-iraq-13-05-2014.aspx  
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conduct an actual trial of British commanders, the criticism on ICC for being a neo-imperialist 
Western tool - as some African leaders metaphorically stated – is not as appealing as before. 
Closer involvement with the ICC may provide a good chance for China to adjust the existing 
legal norms as well as international power structure that used to be exclusively dominated by 
the Western powers.  
Lastly, judicial reforms in China have already brought about some compatibility with the ICC. 
Despite the frequently-raised concern that the transnational jurisdiction could contradict the 
state sovereignty, the Chinese government acknowledges the necessity of cross-border 
jurisdiction in moderating transnational crimes, when a crime is not covered by ‘the territorial, 
personal or protective jurisdictions of a state.’ 75  The Standing Committee of the National 
People’s Congress of China adopted a decision in 1987 on ‘Exercising Criminal Jurisdiction 
over Crimes Prescribed in the International Treaties”,76 that “China shall … exercise criminal 
jurisdiction over crimes prescribed in the international treaties to which China is a Party or has 
acceded.’ This decision filled up a gap between China’s national legislation and its 
international obligations, and further indicates domestic steps that have been taken and that are 
complementary to the international criminal norms. 77 
Since the 1980s, China has acceded to or signed various international treaties that involve 
transnational jurisdiction, such as the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes 
against Internationally Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents,
 
the Convention for the 
Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful 
Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation, the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear 
Material, and the International Convention against the Taking of Hostages.78 In short, Chinese 
policy-makers see the necessity of expanding China’s participation in the international legal 
system in the globalizing era. In October 2014, the Fourth Plenum of Central Committee of the 
CPC officially announced the national strategy of enhancing ‘socialist rule of law’, and 
underlining the status of the Chinese Constitution.79 It is seen as a positive progress of judicial 
advancement in China, and opens the possibility for China to accept and apply the international 
                                                 
75 Statement by Chinese Delegate At the 68th Session of the UN General Assembly On Agenda Item 86 Scope and 
Application of the Principle of Universal Jurisdiction, released 17 October 2013, accessed 12 June 2015 via: 
http://www.china-un.org/eng/hyyfy/t1091531.htm  
76Database of Laws and Regulations,  accessed 10 August 2015 via: http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Law/2007-
12/12/content_1383929.htm  
77 Benjamin L. Liebman, “Assessing China's Legal Reforms,” Columbia Journal of Asian Law, 2009 Fall, Issue 1, 
page 19. 
78 高铭暄、王秀梅：《普遍管辖权的特征及本土化思考》，载于《法制与社会发展》，2001 年第 6 期, 页 22-
23(GAO Minxuan, WANG Xiumei (2001), “On Features of Universal Jurisdiction and Its Localization”, Law and 
Social Development, Issue 6, page 22-23).  
79  Communique of the Fourth Plenum of Central Committee of the CPC, released by Xinhua, released 23 October 
2014, accessed 17 December 2014 via: news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2014-10/23/c_1112953884.htm  
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legal norms that detach state heads from states, and punish criminals –regardless of their 
official ranking - who shocked the conscience of humanity. 
Summarized briefly, the construction and acceptance of international norms may be slow, but it 
is an irreversible process. A relevant example is that in the 1970s ‘the answer given to 
discussion of human rights was as often no as yes. Today it has become completely normal for 
states to pursue human rights objectives in their bilateral and multilateral foreign policies.’80 
Chinese foreign policy has been more pragmatic than ever, and the CPC leaders ‘have learned 
quickly how the international systems work.’  
5. CONCLUSION 
‘The only constancy is change,’ says an ancient Greek philosopher Heraclitus of Ephesus. 
Change, be it evolutionary or revolutionary, is a sure status of human society. The interplay 
between China and the ICC is no exception to this constancy.  
China’s position vis-à-vis the ICC has materialized as a crucial topic of contention in the 
agenda for safeguarding international criminal justice. Albeit the fact that China has not 
acceded to the Rome Statute and expressed its critique of the ICC on various occasions, the 
conventional normative analyses don’t seem to do enough justice to China’s intention and 
interests in furthering its involvement with international institutions. This article has tried to 
draw readers’ attention to not only the rationale behind China’s stance toward the ICC from a 
contextual perspective, but also a number of significant changes taking place within China. 
The ICC is embedded in a cross-cultural consensus reached by the international community that 
the ends of state sovereignty have to be scrutinized. The conceptual change and also 
institutional experiments conducted at regional levels generated a normative framework that 
states should yield part of their sovereignty and cooperate on cross-territory trials when justice 
is challenged. This norm based on which the Rome Statute was drafted does not, however, take 
into consideration that trigger mechanisms of the ICC’s investigation are deemed problematic 
by not only Chinese government but also the general public when the state consent is bypassed.  
As analyzed in the third section on the discrepancy, China undertook to join the Western-led 
international regime and get acquainted with the international legal system in the early 
twentieth century, hoping to import modern institutions from the West. However, deeply 
disappointed by the outcome of 1919 Peace Treaty of Versailles, political leaders and 
intellectual elites realized the prevalence of hypocrisy at the international stage. In light of the 
ICC’s predominant activeness in Africa, the cases before the ICC reinforce China’s historical 
concern that today’s international system may still be hypercritical in a sense that not every 
state is treated fairly and equally. 
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State integrity is not only a political issue, but also a cultural one in China. The pro-nationalism 
‘May Fourth Movement’ in 1919 has a far-reaching impact on Chinese common psyche. 
‘Standing up as an independent country’, as proclaimed by Mao Zedong on 1st October 1949, 
has become an almost unchallengeable ideology in Chinese discourse. China’s belief in state 
integrity is attached to morality. The Chinese government has been attempting to be perceived 
as a responsible and fair big power by the world, and adhered to its claim that the will of any 
state regardless of its geo-political and economic influence shall be respected. The Chinese 
government prefers bilateral negotiations, multilateral dialogues and international moderations 
over any kind of third-party litigious and military measures to resolve international matters. 
Hence the ICC’s litigious operation with little observed efforts to facilitate peace negotiations 
within the national boundary is interpreted as irresponsible by China.  
 Since the late 1980s, the Chinese government has been devoted to judicial reforms. As of 
today, the ICC has not clarified the particular order of complementarity, gravity of the crime 
and a state’s unwillingness or inability for the decision of case admissibility. Several powers of 
the ICC’s Prosecutor, such as initiating investigations proprio motu on the basis of ICC’s 
jurisdiction, are likely to result in the scenario where the capacity and willingness of a State is 
judged by a supranational actor. This type of external judgment would be intolerable to China. 
Moreover, the complementarity principle also means that the ICC should provide assistance to 
a State Party, but the actual operation of the ICC seems to be just one-directional with no 
efforts to amplify the existing judicial remedies at the national level. A beneficial outlook for 
being a state party to the ICC is unclear to China. 
Speaking of the ‘beneficial outlook,’ the Chinese government - and the Chinese population also 
– is renowned for being pragmatic as analyzed in the fourth section on the synergy. Now that 
China is more and more exposed to the international system, the Chinese government is testing 
a ‘proactive diplomacy’ and protecting China’s interests according to its preferred norms in the 
21st century. Providing that the socio-political environment in Africa is hampered by 
corruption, conflicts and weakness of formal institutions, China’s strategic interests are being 
challenged to a large extent. Institutional studies have shown that the Chinese policy-makers 
are becoming more institutionalized and relying more on standard rules and procedural 
regulations. It is foreseeable that China will increasingly resort to legal measures available in 
the international arena. Actually China has ratified a series of international treaties since the 
1980s, some of which involve jurisdictional concession.  
At the domestic level, the CPC Central Committee has proclaimed to accelerate judicial 
reforms. It is likely that international legal norms will be more compatible with Chinese 
national system in the future, which ameliorates the relation between China and the ICC. At the 
international level, the ICC decided in 2014 to re-open its preliminary examination on alleged 
crimes committed by the armed forces of the United Kingdom in Iraq between 2003 and 2008. 
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This is a positive sign that the previously unquestionably status of Western big powers is being 
challenged. Contingent on the broad shift in the international power structure, China as a ‘calm 
observer’ can wisely switch its skeptical stance toward the ICC.  
After all, compared with Mao’s era when ideological values mattered a lot in policy-making, 
and Deng’s reforming period in which development was deemed the predominant national 
objective, current Xi Jinping administration has displayed a different mindset in positioning 
China’s role in the international system. If China aims to ‘be better heard and understood by the 
world,’81 and to ‘value justice as much as interests’, a deeper cooperation with ICC does seem a 
rational choice to China. 
 
                                                 
81 In a CPC national meeting on “Publicity and Ideological work” in August 2013, stressed President Xi Jinping, 
that it is imperative to “tell China’s stories well and spread China’s voice widely,” released 21 August 2013,  
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